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Since the 1960s, the allocation of resources in couples has been the object of much research 
in both the fields of economics and sociology. Today, the growth of women’s economic 
independence and their increased potential to control economic resources within their 
households raise important questions about the dynamics of intra-household sharing and calls 
for a reconsideration of the existing theories on the allocation of household resources. This 
article has the aim of reviewing in a non-technical way the two lines of research, respectively in 
economics and sociology, which have focused on the sharing of financial resources within a 
common unit of analysis: the household. After outlining their alternative applications and 
highlighting the similarities and differences between the two--starting from the unitary models 
of behavior and encompassing bargaining theory, collective goods, and transaction cost 
approach -we discuss new developments in the form of the dynamic models and preference 
theory. Finally, we reflect on the challenges that the field currently faces and suggest possible 
pathways for future research.  
Keywords: Sharing, Financial resources, Family, Bargaining, Transaction Costs, Preference 
Theory 
1. Introduction 
Women’s economic and social standing in Western countries dramatically improved 
throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century. The increase in female enrolment in 
education (Breen et al. 2010) and the greater presence and competitiveness of women in 
the labour market (Bettio et al. 2013; OECD 2014) led to important changes in the way 
women’s employment is perceived and acknowledged (Treas and Windmer 2000). The 
diffusion of gender equality at the societal level implies that gender relations at the 
individual level have also been changing (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Cunningham 
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2008). In particular, the growths in women’s economic independence and men’s 
economic dependence (Sorensen 2003; Karmessini and Rubery 2013) in recent decades 
raise important questions about the current gendered division of paid labour, and has 
implications for a shift in control over economic resources in households (Bennett 
2013). Consequently, the societal move towards more equality has triggered much 
theoretical reasoning, as well as empirical research, on intra-household sharing 
dynamics (cfr. Bennet 2013). 
Since the late 1950s, scholars from economics and sociology have been producing 
two parallel bodies of literature that share the same unit of analysis, that is, the 
household
i
, and revolve around a number of commonalities. Efforts have been made in 
the past to review and unite some of this work on a broad range of within-household 
activities that are shared between partners (Grossbard-Shechtman, 2001), and with the 
goal of providing a more inclusive framework. Unlike previous studies, this article has 
the aim of reviewing in a non-technical way one particular aspect of the two lines of 
research on within-household allocation – monetary and non-monetary factors 
influencing sharing of financial resources – in the light of the historical changes in 
gender roles. General theory on intra-household sharing is applied to the specific cases 
of the division of financial goods. Both streams have developed in the context of 
societies evolving from being mainly based on the male breadwinner/female 
homemaker model, as in the 1960s, to societies where the dual-earner household has 
become predominant (Blossfeld and Drobnič 2001). The societal changes that have 
taken place over the decades have posed challenges to the study of the allocation of 
resources, and still require constant re-evaluations of the dynamics underpinning 
household sharing. Here, we compare the rational choice framework with the 
sociological literature in a broader context, rather than focusing on a detailed review of 
selected theoretical stances as proposed in some of the previous field-specific review 
studies (Bennett 2013; Donni and Chiappori 2011; Himmelweit et al. 2013). We 
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propose a unified framework for the topic of intra-household sharing and argue that the 
two lines of literature both reflect the reality of gender relations in different historical 
moments, or different subjects’ perceptions of this reality, diverging in some 
interpretations and converging in others. The article reviews major theoretical 
contributions and selected empirical evidence from western industrialised countries, 
which are characterized by a specific institutional and cultural context. However, we 
acknowledge the existence of broad literature on the household allocation of resources 
in developing countries, which largely contributed to the development of theory. 
Finally, we adopt a perspective to look at changes of women’s rather than men’s 
behaviour, as the historical change of roles dominantly affected women. 
The article is divided in two parts. The first of these is devoted to what can be 
considered the three – theoretical and empirical – pillars of the study of intra-household 
sharing: a) the early unitary models of family behaviour in economics and sociology; b) 
the relative resources approach and bargaining theories; and c) the collective 
investments, collective goods and transaction costs approaches. In the second part of the 
article, we introduce new developments in economics and sociology by discussing 
dynamic models of intra-household allocation and the relevance of preferences, i.e. the 
freedom of women and men to decide and re-examine their within-household allocation 
of resources. 
Part one: The three cornerstones of household sharing 
2.1 Unitary models of family behaviour: Parsons and Becker 
Over recent decades, there have been several attempts to frame the mechanisms 
underlying individual behaviour and exchanges within households. The first models of 
family behaviour were unitary models, in which individual behaviour was assumed to 
be intrinsically linked to the partner’s behaviour. Under this approach, the family 
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operates on the basis of common goals to which all the members contribute with 
different means. The sociologist Talcott Parsons was the first to propose an ideal model 
of the family that followed this perspective (Parsons and Bales 1956). The core of 
Parsons’ theory was sex role specialization between spouses. In his view, women play 
an ‘expressive’ role in the family, offering emotional support to both husbands and 
children, while men have an ‘instrumental’ role, providing the means of living. In this 
model, men are expected to fill the role of the breadwinner, while women’s employment 
is welcome only to the extent that it does not change the standard allocation of 
obligations. One of the main norms that regulated the interaction between family 
members in the Parsonian model was equal access to family finance by both husbands 
and wives (Cheal 1999). Thus, for Parsons, family was ‘one’ rather than ‘two’, and 
decisions were made to benefit both equally. 
Sociologist Talcott Parsons’s unitary approach was, to some extent, further 
developed in economics first by Paul Samuelson (1956),  and later by Gary Becker 
(1981), father of the so-called ‘new home economics2’, who contributed to economic 
theory by further developing the joint welfare function of the household, originally 
proposed in the consensus model of Samuelson  (1956)
3
. Becker’s work was a further 
development of his models within the theory of marriage in which individuals have their 
own utility and may disagree on how to allocate the benefits from marriage (Becker, 
1973, 1974). In Becker’s Treatise on family, household members are assumed to 
rationally take on specialized roles based on their relative productivities, with the 
ultimate goal of increasing overall household utility. In the typical case, women 
specialize in home production and men in market production. However, there is no 
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impediment to women specializing in market production and men in home production, 
as long as it benefits the interest of all. The fundamental aspect of the theory is that the 
head of the family is assumed to be altruistic in his distribution of family resources, 
guaranteeing equal financial wellbeing to all family members. Issues of inequality or 
conflict within the family are not ignored in Becker’s view, but they are not seen as 
especially problematic as long as they are internalized within the utility maximization 
process. In other words, Becker assumed that specialization would minimize potential 
conflicts within families by creating dependencies between wives and husbands and by 
stimulating efficiency. Moreover, family members were expected to altruistically 
attempt to maximize the household utility, even if this did not appear to immediately 
benefit them (Becker 1981b). 
The models proposed by Parsons and Bales and by Becker were developed in times 
and places where the male breadwinner model was predominant. Indeed, the period 
following WWII was a time of economic flourishing in many Western countries, 
characterized by very high male employment rates that allowed partnered women to 
refrain from paid work and concentrate on unpaid domestic work (Lewis 2001). 
The unitary approach was developed in the socio-economic contexts experienced by 
its initial proponents (Parsons and Bales 1956), but was later challenged by the 
changing roles of women in society, which posed the problem of incorporating women 
as earners in models of family behaviour. Scholars from both economics and sociology 
attempted to overcome this issue over successive years with the so-called relative 
resources and bargaining perspectives, which however complemented rather than 
replaced the unitary models (Grossbard-Shechtman, 2001). 
1.2 Bargaining theories and the relative resources approach 
As mentioned, the unitary family models were developed when the male 
breadwinner/female homemaker household type was extremely common in 
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industrialized societies. Hence, it is not surprising that questions about the intra-
household allocation of resources, within-couple sharing, and economic (in)dependence 
became prominent only when women started being increasingly present in education 
systems and the labour market. These questions paved the way for more focus on the 
independent individual models of decision-making within the new home economics, 
and the consequent development of non-unitary models in economics and relative 
resources theories in sociology (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994; McElroy and 
Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980). The change of focus was further supported by 
the increasing availability of survey instruments that allowed initial analyses of within-
household bargaining dynamics (e.g. the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the US, 
which has collected data since 1968). Independent individual models of decision-
making do not assume jointness of decision-making in families (Grossbard, 2012). 
Similarly, in bargaining and relative resource theory models, both partners (husband and 
wife) can rely on their individual endowments, for example in terms of education and 
income, to try to reach a compromise on the decisions that affect the household.  
When explaining intra-household relations, economists rely on several applied game-
theoretic models, namely cooperative, non-cooperative and collective models. The 
major concept in these theories is Pareto efficiency, which can be defined as a state in 
which any improvement in individual wellbeing will negatively affect the wellbeing of 
the other negotiator. In cooperative models (also known as Nash bargaining models), 
the bargaining stance of each partner is determined by the availability of alternatives 
outside the relationship, and these are compared with the current cooperative 
relationship (e.g. marriage). The balance between the two defines a ‘threat point’, at 
which both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ options are equally attractive. Importantly, partners in 
the relationship can reach an efficient agreement as the result of a cooperative game. 
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) introduce the cooperative 
model with divorce as a threat point, whereas Lundberg and Pollak (1993) suggest an 
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alternative specification where the divorce threat is replaced by a non-cooperation 
threat, which is internal to marriage. In the latter, when the threat point is reached, each 
member may contribute to the household public good through personal choice, which 
leads to a low-functioning marriage with separate spheres. A second group of game 
theoretic models extends the focus (Browning and Lechene 2001; Kanbur and Haddad 
1994; Lundberg and Pollak 2003) to the principle of non-cooperation and self-binding 
agreements between partners. In this approach, both partners autonomously decide on 
the amount of commonalities they are willing to provide and share, maximizing at the 
same time their own (financial) wellbeing independently of the behaviour of the partner. 
The result of their agreement is not necessarily Pareto efficient, as it is still possible to 
improve the position of one partner without the other’s position deteriorating; indeed, 
these models do not set efficiency of outcomes as a requirement. The presence of 
inefficiency might also be influenced by social factors, such as gender norms or cultural 
bias, which can shape individuals’ power within and outside the family, and might alter 
the way individuals interact. Lastly, collective models encompass both the unitary 
framework and cooperative models so that each becomes a special application of the 
collective approach (Chiappori 1988, 1992). The basic features of this approach are 
efficiency of outcomes and the presence of the ‘sharing rule’, which means proportions 
of the household expenditure being attributed to different household members. The 
sharing rule is affected by individual bargaining power (distributional factors), although 
the final outcomes of the negotiation will also depend on household preferences. Hence, 
the model allows the influence of non-economic factors in bargaining, paving the way 
for further links with sociological stances that will be discussed below. 
Indeed, economic theory assumes that bargaining takes place in the household, 
leaving all institutional factors, such as the labour and marriage markets, aside as 
exogenous. But what if the economic models do not represent the real game because 
‘the “real action” is elsewhere: in the game before the game’ (Pollak 1994:150)? 
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Individual preferences and human behaviour might already be shaped by external 
factors such as breadwinning norms, gender-biased attitudes, culture and institutions, 
leaving little space for a true bargaining outcome as modelled in economics. The 
challenge for bargaining research has been how to encompass these (social) factors 
when modelling complex household dynamics. Some of these issues are, however, more 
considered by sociologists. 
Sociological theory also encompasses a variety of approaches to intra-household 
sharing of financial resources. The bargaining view in sociology, as a direct sociological 
equivalent to the economic theory, takes the form of a resource theory of power, and 
was first found in the writings of Blood and Wolfe (1960). Their findings, based on over 
900 interviews with wives in and around Detroit, indicated that decision-making 
processes within American households were largely driven by the spouses’ individual 
resources. In other words, women’s economic resources, their employment and the 
length of employment gave them more power within the household, also to influence 
the relative share of expenditures. Blumstein and Schwartz (1984) reached similar 
conclusions when looking into the role of wives’ income contributions in the balance of 
power between spouses. Finally, Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) developed the so-
called ‘economic dependency’ sub-approach, suggesting that the power structure of the 
family is a function of the married woman’s economic dependency. More recent 
literature in this stream emphasizes that women benefit from distinct intellectual 
capabilities and achievements that matter more than income in the sharing of resources 
within the family (Gerson 1985, 1993; Hakim and Blossfeld 1997; Hochschild and 
Machung 1989; Kulic 2014). In this view, diversity of work trajectories, type of job and 
career potential are additions to the ‘power’ of relative income in relative sharing of 
expenditures. 
Resource theory mainly emphasizes economic or, more broadly, human capital as 
bargaining tools towards a more equal share of financial resources. Yet, a few years 
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ago, Catherine Hakim (2010) took a different direction by turning attention
ii
 towards an 
asset that had generally been ignored in sociological and economic theories: physical 
and affective characteristics in the form of ‘erotic capital’. Hakim defines erotic capital 
as a set of assets encompassing beauty, sexual attractiveness and social skills in 
interaction that women and men can rely on to obtain their objectives: ‘attractive people 
are more successful at wielding influence to get what they want, in the workplace and in 
business as well as in private relationships’ (Hakim 2000:199). Hakim argues that 
overall women are more endowed with erotic capital than men, a fact that on average 
increases their bargaining power in marriages
iii
. Men, however, also have their stock of 
erotic capital, which according to the author has actually increased over recent decades. 
The major limitation in the study of erotic capital and of its relevance in the bargaining 
process is the difficulty in measuring it. Indeed, not only do definitions of beauty, 
sexual attractiveness and social skills vary cross-nationally and over time, but scholars 
are still struggling to understand how much of these are defined by individual 
subjectivity and how much is shared among the collectivity (Langlois et al. 2000; 
Hönekopp 2006). Indeed, including erotic capital in empirical research could yield 
significant contributions to our understanding of within-couple exchanges, including 
those of material resources, but the difficulties in obtaining high-quality data for this 
special type of capital – especially in large-scale surveys – explains why few attempts 
have been carried out so far. 
Sociological theory also accounts for norms, culture and institutions as factors that 
additionally affect the intra-household distribution of resources (Vogler 1998). These 
are explicitly studied in the literature on the management of finances within households 
(Bennett et al. 2012; Himmelweit et al. 2013). Theories of money management (Pahl 
1983; Vogler and Pahl 1994; Vogler 1998) enrich the resources approach with an 
important additional dimension, that is, the way in which money is managed and 
organized once it enters the household. Resource theory assumes that the economic 
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characteristics of partners influence their common decision-making. Hence, the more 
women earn, the more power and control over decision-making in finances they will be 
able to exercise. However, gender inequalities in sharing could derive even more from 
women’s access to money than women’s relative income. And women’s access to 
finances depends highly on societal values. Sociologists Vogler and Pahl (1994) define 
two types of power: power over executive decisions and power over strategic decisions. 
The latter is used as a proxy for power relations within households, although power in 
strategic decision-making will also depend largely on power over executive decisions, 
net of the economic characteristics of the partners. That is, systems of money 
management are related to differences in power and living standards between partners 
as well as to other socio-demographic characteristics. In their study, they identify four 
different types of allocative systems – or money management systems – among couples, 
namely the female whole wage system, the male whole wage system, the housekeeping 
allowance system and joint pooling. Full female executive control of all income except 
for the husband’s personal spending money characterizes the first system, whereas in 
the male whole wage system, the executive control of money is in the hands of the 
husband. The housekeeping allowance system allows the wife a housekeeping 
allowance while the rest of the money is managed by the husband; finally, in the joint 
system couples pool and manage their money jointly. This typology does not explicitly 
deal with various forms of income, but is empirically (and theoretically) extendable to 
considering various sources. Several empirical studies find that the organization of 
finances is sensitive to whether income derives from regular or sporadic employment, 
individual or family state benefits, inheritance, investments and so on (Nyman 2002; 
Pahl 2008), and that it further depends on how these forms of money are viewed by men 
and women in different societies and in different historical periods (Nyman and 
Reinikainen 2007). 
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Understanding the factors that influence the executive control of money is partly a 
‘which came first’ exercise, since having direct access to economic resources, e.g. in the 
form of earned income, is likely to be an advantage in accessing control over them. 
Nevertheless, research has shown that women can have little control over economic 
decision-making despite having their own earnings (Pahl 1994; Vogler et al. 2008a; 
Vogler et al. 2008b). Indeed, ideological and cultural values, in particular those of men, 
play an important role in balancing out (increasing or decreasing) husbands’ initial 
economic power. An example of such an ideology is breadwinning. The theory of 
money management in the household relies on Lukes’ more general three-dimensional 
model of power, which takes into account the ideological factors in decision-making as 
a third dimension of power (Vogler 1998). Certainly, the advantage of money 
management theory is that it provides us with an explanation that goes beyond 
traditional resource theory, distinguishing between who brings in (various forms of) 
income, who spends the money, and who finally consumes (Bonke 2015; Himmelweit 
et al. 2013). 
Another important limitation of the relative resources approaches lies in the 
assumption that partners are independent members whose interests often conflict. Pure 
bargaining, however, does not always fully represent household behaviour, and scholars 
have striven to develop additional theories to account for this. 
1.3 Collective investments, collective goods and the transaction costs approach 
While bargaining reflects a competitive interaction between individuals, union 
formation relies on collective investments: when people marry, they combine 
‘individualism’ with ‘collectivism’, and they not only negotiate but also invest in the 
new relationship. This is the dimension of human behaviour that easily relates to profit-
oriented organizations, which operate on the basis of common investments and 
efficiency. Indeed, a concept from the economics of organizations, namely the 
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transaction costs approach, serves as a model to explain family behaviour, in addition to 
the relative resources and bargaining perspectives. 
The transaction cost approach was developed in the early eighties within 
organizational theory (Chandlers 1962; Feller 1973; Macneil 1974; Williamson 1981). 
The concept was different from other organizational theories because it dealt with how 
firms generate efficiency by minimizing the cost of each individual transaction. 
Williamson (1981) initially suggested that the concept was conceived for profit-oriented 
organizational environments, but he did not exclude other possible specifications, given 
its potential adaptability. This approach was only extended to non-commercial settings 
by Pollak (1985), whose work on bargaining models was essential for explaining the 
intra-household distribution of material resources. He recognized the importance of a 
common objective in the behaviour of family members, explaining that it helped to 
minimize the transaction costs of family life. Hence, Pollak argued that marriage works 
as a ‘governance structure’ that influences the behaviour of family members by adding a 
non-market dimension to market-based intra-family bargaining. This must not be 
confused with the household utility function that was central to the unitary approaches 
discussed earlier. According to the transaction cost approach, in fact, individual 
bargaining is influenced by the collective character of the investments involved, but is 
not overridden by it. Hence, the interests of each household member enter the equation 
along with some common utility. In sociology, the transaction costs approach has been 
used to explain efficiency gains in relation to the choice of household money 
management system. Treas (1993: 723) argues that in American families there are 
‘competing pulls between the individual and the collective’, specifically in relation to 
how spouses pool their economic resources. As previously discussed, the motivation for 
choosing one type of money management over another depends on many factors but it 
is also related to the minimization of transaction costs. Hence, couples prefer 
organizational forms (e.g. total pooling vs. separate purses) that help them better 
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coordinate their relationship, reduce disagreements and facilitate monitoring. The right 
choice of financial organization means more relationship efficiency. For this reason, 
couples with high relationship investments, children and common property often choose 
pooling regimes to facilitate transactions (Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen 2007). Thus, the 
minimization of transaction costs would represent what economists call a ‘collective 
good’, the pursuit of which is assumed to influence the extent to which individuals 
defend their own interests. 
The meaning of collective good, however, has been changing with newly emerging 
forms of relationships in contrast to marriage, which also favour new ways of 
controlling and sharing money, and introduce separate management among the standard 
financial organization systems. In the independent management system, individuals 
have separate responsibility for their personal finances, or alternatively some money is 
collectively owned and some is private. Although the new systems, along with the new 
forms of relationship, were initially associated with more equality of power (Giddens 
1992) and more efficiency, empirical confirmation of this has not arrived. On the 
contrary, several studies (Vogler et al. 2008a; Vogler et al. 2008b) find that with 
independent management the higher earner exercises more control, and the principle of 
equal financial contributions by partners is more harmful to women, who traditionally 
earn less. By and large, according to management theory, pooled regimes maintain their 
position as the most egalitarian management practice, equating the pursuit of efficiency 
with the pursuit of pooling income. 
2. Part two: Revisiting the intra-household sharing of material resources: dynamic 
models of intra-household sharing and preference theory 
In the late 20
th
 century, the meaning of women’s economic dependence was revisited 
to question previous theorizing. New views accounted for the dynamic nature of couple 
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relationships, and for women (and men) acting only according to their preferences as a 
consequence of (nearly) achieved gender equality in many areas of life. 
Economic research has grown to explicitly model dynamic settings by questioning 
the static nature of the sharing rule in collective models. In fact, the allocation of 
expenditures over the life cycle depends on how bargaining power and preferences 
evolve over time in relation to the changing opportunities of the household members 
(Himmleweit et al. 2013; Mazzocco 2004, 2007; Lich-Tyler 2001, 2003). The new 
models distinguish between two types of efficiency: full commitment efficiency and 
limited commitment efficiency; the former assumes that the first negotiation of a 
sharing rule remains intact, whereas the latter implies several re-negotiations of the 
initial agreement out of choice and due to new opportunities. In fact, inter-temporal re-
negotiation is more realistic in a contemporary couple where the constant pursuit of a 
‘higher standard of human happiness’ (Hochschild and Machung 1989: 167) in marriage 
is a norm, and it impacts on the nature of mutual commitments. New empirical evidence 
has also highlighted the role of public policies in affecting the change of negotiating 
power of women in a couple (Mazzocco 2007). 
The importance of preferences in individual behaviour has been acknowledged by 
economic theory both in the past and in the present. As previously discussed, unitary 
models relied on the assumption of common household decisions, and collective models 
combined a resource-based perspective with household preferences. However, 
individual preferences play a more important role in recent developments in economic 
theory in studies of partners’ changing bargaining power over the years. 
Recent sociological theories are also beginning to focus on the role of preferences, 
and question the existence of unequal intra-household sharing in the light of the (nearly) 
achieved gender equality in the labour market, as ‘men are increasingly dependent on 
their wives’ income’ in most industrialized societies (Sorensen 2003:295). This view is 
linked to preference theory, which argues that women’s economic dependence is a 
16 
 
choice (Sorensen 2003) that does not necessarily worsen their bargaining (and financial) 
position in the household. As such, the unequal position of women in intra-household 
sharing only becomes relevant for those societies where free choice is not possible. 
Unlike economic theory, preferences are seen in this literature as self-sufficient, and 
independent of the real conditions surrounding women and men. Two sociological 
explanations emerged that contributed to this perspective. One was developed in the 
United States starting from the 1980s in the work of Gerson (1985, 1993, 2009), while 
the other evolved in Europe from the early 1990s and is expressed in the work of Hakim 
(1991,1996, 2000). Both theoretical approaches are based on the principle of women’s 
preferences to choose one particular life path. In Gerson’s ‘Hard Choices’ (1985), we 
find the idea of a ‘subtle’ revolution in women’s roles for the first time. Following the 
new reality of American society from the 1970s onwards, Gerson defines two possible 
female life paths: the domestic and the non-domestic. Domestic women are those whose 
focus is on family, homemaking and children. If they work, they do so mostly in female 
professions. By contrast, non-domestic women are oriented towards having a career and 
being continuously in full-time employment, with or without children. The author 
elaborates on the motivations influencing women’s choices between a career and 
homemaking, outlining reasons that are related to the past, such as family environment, 
or to the present, in the form of opportunities. In her ‘Unfinished Revolution’ (2009), 
Gerson continues her research on contemporary couples and suggests that although 
women have faced many changes, the categories of women have not changed much. 
She distinguishes between three groups of women (self-reliant, egalitarian and neo-
traditional) that correspond to her first classification of women’s constrained choices 
(Gerson 1985). The European equivalent of Gerson’s approach is Hakim’s ‘Work-life 
Style Choices in the 21st Century’ (2000). As in Gerson’s work, women’s behaviour is 
ultimately grounded in their preference for a certain lifestyle. According to her theory, 
in ‘affluent modern societies’ women may choose whether to be employed, and how 
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much to work, based on their preferred behaviour. Both theories, similar to feminist 
theories, are concerned with individuals rather than households, and focus on women 
making choices in their own best interest. Hakim’s view, however, is somewhat more 
radical because of her argument that in recent decades equality between women and 
men has been reached, and thus women’s behaviour is not determined by external 
constraints but is internally chosen. Hence, according to the author, within-gender 
differences, that is, the differences between home-centred, adaptive and career-oriented 
women are greater than the differences between a career-oriented woman and a man. 
The true gender difference lies in women being granted the choice of preferred life 
style, while men are not: ‘The fact remains that women can do as well from marriage 
careers as men do from employment careers. More importantly, women today have a 
choice between using the marriage market or the labour market to achieve social status, 
self-expression and material wellbeing’ (Hakim 2000: 161). According to some versions 
of relative resource theory, home-centred and adaptive women who choose to forego 
labour-related earnings are bound to a position of reduced power within the relationship. 
Hakim, however, emphasizes that achieved educational equality between genders is 
equally likely to protect a woman from an unequal allocation of financial resources in 
households. 
A major drawback of the latest sociological theoretical stances, in particular of 
Hakim’s, lies in the belief that there is equality of choice for women with a 
corresponding influence on equality of bargaining power and sharing of financial 
resources between spouses. As McRae (2003) points out, there is little, if any, empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that women’s behaviour is guided by their preferences. 
Indeed, it is most likely that women – more than meniv – are faced with a number of 
constraints that force them into a lifestyle that is not necessarily their original 
preference: ‘The existence of a continuum of work-family preferences means that 
women with similar preferences (but differing capacities for overcoming constraints) 
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will have very different labour market careers.’ (McRae 2003: 318). High childcare 
costs, for example, could coerce a work-oriented woman to stay at home to mind her 
children, while an unemployed partner could force a home-centred woman into 
employment. Even the partner’s preferences regarding the woman’s employment 
choices might have a constraining effect on her options. By focusing exclusively on 
women’s preferences, Hakim overlooks the constraints that might impede women from 
reaching their desired lifestyles. Similarly, the author does not discuss how existing 
constraints at the societal level might influence women’s preferences themselves 
(Vogler 1998). In other words, it is unclear how and why women develop different 
preferences and to what extent pre-existing social constraints (i.e. socialization) are 
related to women maturing diverging orientations. Ultimately, it is likely that the very 
high levels of liberalization and individualization that characterize the two countries 
which are the settings of preference theory – the United States and the United Kingdom 
– might be able to support the assumption that in contemporary societies women truly 
have a choice of the lifestyle to adopt. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine women 
genuinely developing autonomous preferences in settings that have much stronger 
norms of gender behaviour that are likely to have implications for the sharing of 
material resources within families. 
3. Conclusions 
In this article, we have discussed and summarized in a non-technical manner the 
main streams in research on the intra-household sharing of material resources in 
economics and sociology, starting from the emergence of the first theoretical 
considerations. Since then, both disciplines have witnessed similar trends that were 
shaped by societal developments in gender equality both within and outside the 
household. The article has contributed to a more comprehensive picture of the whole 
field by comparing and merging the theoretical stances deriving from different schools 
19 
 
of thought. We have argued that the economic dependence of women was already 
acknowledged in the field in the early 1960s, although it was not seriously studied until 
the early 1980s. The mainstream view in sociology, economics, and also public policy, 
was that dependency of women was unproblematic for an equal economic position of 
the spouses: the assumption that years of economic and social stratification research 
was premised upon was that the head of the family transferred his employment relations 
and corresponding material benefits to all family members equally, including his partner 
(wife) (Becker 1981; Goldhorpe 1983; Parsons and Bales 1956). Evidence suggests that 
a significant change in perspectives on intra-household sharing of material resources 
took place when (educated) women entered the labour market in large numbers, 
stimulating a change in the evaluation of women’s work in terms of income. We have 
briefly summarized the theoretical interest in bargaining within the household from the 
perspectives of both economics and sociology (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Lundberg and 
Pollak 1996), and discussed the later consideration of collective instead of individual 
factors in bargaining. Recent developments in both disciplines represent a move 
towards new views: a dynamic modelling of intra-household sharing and a revisiting of 
women’s economic dependence in the light of their preferred lifestyles. The article has 
also emphasized the lack of consideration of social contexts (norms, values, culture and 
geography) in the relevant economic and sociological theories. 
Is there a need to further redefine previous theories on intra-household sharing (of 
material resources)? The changes in intimate relationships and in the definition of 
family that have taken place in Western countries in recent decades suggest there is. 
Indeed, as marriage rates have declined there has been an increase in the number of 
consensual unions (Thornton and Axinn 2007) and of ‘atypical’ unions and marriages, 
where partners live in different locations – Living Apart Together (LAT) – but share the 
same commitments as other married or cohabitating couples (Cherlin 2010; Liefbroer et 
al. 2015). The growth in consensual unions and of LAT arrangements points towards a 
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diffusion of preferences for independence and autonomy that might not mesh well with 
the assumptions underlying bargaining and collective investment theories. Also, the fact 
that homosexual couples have not been largely considered up to now is another limit of 
the theory that should be overcome. Hence, future theoretical developments on intra-
household sharing will have to take into account the continuing development of intimate 
relationships, the preferences of the couples who inhabit them, and the inevitable 
evolution of the relationship between genders to fully account for the way contemporary 
couples share economic resources. This will also require improved and more complex 
survey instruments, both longitudinal and cross-national, to capture behaviours, 
attitudes, values, preferences, and lifestyle arrangements, not just at the individual level 
but also at the couple level. 
Moreover, while some of the new forms of family arrangement stem from a decline 
in traditional views about gender roles and family formation (Inglehart 2008), others are 
due to economic conditions and to the changing employment opportunities for men and 
women. The recent economic crisis is an extreme example of an exogenous change in 
employment conditions that might have had an impact on intimate relationships. Indeed, 
the loss of jobs in manufacturing industry and in the construction sector in the first part 
of the crisis, and the cuts in welfare expenditure and the public sector in the second, 
have affected first men’s and then also women’s positions in the labour market (Bettio 
et al. 2012; Karamessini and Rubery 2014), albeit with different outcomes according to 
the context. On the one hand, the reduced employability of men resulting from the crisis 
could lead to improvements in women’s relative position in the household. On the other 
hand, if jobs are scarce, traditional views about the division of labour between women 
and men might return. Thus, the impact of the economic crisis on living arrangements 
and on the subsequent dynamics of intra-household sharing remains to be seen. Taken 
together, all these developments pose new and important challenges for research on the 
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intra-household sharing of material resources that scholars in both economics and 
sociology will be faced with in the coming years. 
                                                          
i
 The terms ‘family’, ‘household’ and ‘couple’ refer to different units of analysis. In this study, we 
focus on coupled women and men. While fully recognizing the differences between the three concepts, 
throughout the article we shall use the three terms interchangeably to avoid a large number of repetitions. 
ii
 Although other authors had proposed something similar to erotic capital in the past (See Hakim 2010 
for a detailed literature review). 
iii
 The general argument refers to all heterosexual (and homosexual) interactions and should thus 
include cohabitating couples, although not explicitly mentioned. 
iv
 Although male choices are also constrained, women tend to be more affected by the strong structural 
barriers that foster gender inequalities in family and society (Crompton and Harris 1998). 
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